The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) is an initiative introduced in the "Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats", issued by the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries—United States, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy—on June 9, 2018, during their summit in Charlevoix, Quebec. The RRM's mandate is to strengthen the coordination of G7 member countries, as well as "to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response" The G7 is an informal international intergovernmental economic organization that meets annually, whose members represent the seven wealthiest advanced economies in the world, as measured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). == Constituents == The following countries and organisations are members and observers (associate members) of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism: Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands New Zealand Poland Sweden United Kingdom United States European Union North Atlantic Treaty Organization == Mandate == The RRM was mandated to "strengthen coordination to prevent, thwart and respond to malign and evolving threats to G7 democracies." It "will share information and threat analysis related to various threats to democracy, and is an established mechanism to identify opportunities for coordinated response." According to the Institute for Research on Public Policy's Policy Options magazine, the "RRM initiative seeks to strengthen the leading democracies' coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats…including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for a coordinated response." == Administration == The RRM initiative is led by Canada through Global Affairs Canada's Centre for International Digital Policy. Tara Denham, Director of the Centre for International Digital Policy at Global Affairs Canada, directed the team responsible for setting up the RRM Coordination Unit. Global Affairs Canada—the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development—is the federal Canadian ministry responsible for diplomatic and consular relations, international trade, and international development and humanitarian assistance. The Centre for International Digital Policy includes the Digital Inclusion Lab and the RRM. Denham is also the RRM's Canadian Focal Point. At a briefing on "the security and intelligence threats to elections" of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, the chair Bob Zimmer (CPC), said that the 2019 general election "may be different" from past elections in Canada. as the "tools that were used to strengthen civic engagement are being used to undermine, disrupt and destabilize democracy." "Democracies around the world have entered a new era—an era of heightened threat and heightened vigilance—and 2019 will see a number of countries brace for volleys of attempted disruption: India, Australia, Ukraine, Switzerland, Belgium, the EU and, of course, Canada. Evidence has confirmed that the most recent Canadian general election, in 2015, was unencumbered by interference, although there were some relatively primitive attempts to disrupt, misinform and divide. These efforts were few in number and uncoordinated, and had no visible impact on the voter, either online or in line." Zimmer described the initiative's three pillars. "enhancing citizen preparedness" through the "digital citizen initiative" "improving organizational readiness" with national security and intelligence agencies supporting Elections Canada "ensure a comprehensive understanding of and response to any threats to Canada's democratic process." by establishing the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE) which works as a team with the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as Global Affairs Canada Zimmer said that as part of the third pillar, "We have activated the G7 rapid response mechanism, announced at the G7 leaders' summit in Charlevoix, to strengthen coordination among our G7 allies and to ensure that there is international collaboration and coordination in responding to foreign threats to democracy." == Background == === Charlevoix summit === The G7 met from June 8 to 9, 2018 during their summit at the Manoir Richelieu in Charlevoix, in La Malbaie, Quebec. The Charlevoix Summit was the 44th G7 summit. The group issued eight "Commitments" at the summit. They included: Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats Commitment on Equality and Economic Growth Commitment to End Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, Abuse and Harassment in Digital Contexts Declaration on Quality Education for Girls, Adolescent Girls and Women in Developing Countries Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced five themes for Canada's G7 presidency which began in January 2018. === Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats === "We commit to take concerted action in responding to foreign actors who seek to undermine our democratic societies and institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security as outlined in the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats. We recognize that such threats, particularly those originating from state actors, are not just threats to G7 nations, but to international peace and security and the rules-based international order. We call on others to join us in addressing these growing threats by increasing the resilience and security of our institutions, economies and societies, and by taking concerted action to identify and hold to account those who would do us harm." They committed to "cooperate in defending democracies from foreign threats and establish a response mechanism for that purpose". "Democracy and the rules-based international order are increasingly being challenged by authoritarianism and the defiance of international norms. In particular, foreign actors seek to undermine our democratic societies and institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security. These malicious, multi-faceted and ever-evolving tactics constitute a serious strategic threat which we commit to confront together, working with other governments that share our democratic values." The Charlevoix Commitment states that "foreign actors seek to undermine our democratic societies and institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security. These malicious, multi-faceted and ever-evolving tactics constitute a serious strategic threat which we commit to confront together, working together with other governments that share our democratic values." The Charlevoix Summit resolved to "establish a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to strengthen our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response." == Monitored elections == === 2019 European Parliament election === RRM Canada's comprehensive report on the 2019 European Parliament election analyzed open data "related to foreign interference during and leading up to the 2019 European Union Parliamentary Elections, May 23–26, 2019". RRM Canada did not find "significant evidence of state-based foreign interference, or any large-scale, organized and coordinated efforts by non-state actors". They did find that "national or international non-state actors" used tactics based on those used by the Russian sponsored Internet Research Agency (IRA) in previous elections, "such as the 2016 U.S. Elections". For example, blogs, webpages, and social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook and Reddit "were used to spread divisive and false information to damage and negatively impact social cohesion and trust in democratic processes and institutions" in coordinated networks of Facebook groups. === 2019 Alberta general election === RRM Canada's analyz report on the 2019 Alberta general election was intended to "identify any emerging tactics in foreign interference and draw lessons learned for the Canadian general elections scheduled to take place in October 2019." No foreign activity was detected, although the data revealed ""suspicious account creation pattern that is indicative of troll or bot activity". They found "automated inauthentic behaviour and trolling activities" but concluded that they were "very likely domestic". The data showed "suspicious account creation pattern that is indicative of troll or bot activity", and "spikes in account creation" which suggested the "presence of accounts developed for a specific purpose." The accounts were very likely domestic and were "mainly comprised of supporters of the United Conservative Party (UCP)." A seco
Transparency in the software supply chain
Transparency in the software supply chain is a condition in which participants involved in the development, procurement, operation, auditing, or regulation of software can determine which components, dependencies, build stages, identifiers, and relationships within the supply chain make up the delivered product. The disclosure of information about software components, their interrelationships, origins, and development methods—for the purposes of risk management, vulnerability detection, and compliance—takes place throughout the software lifecycle. Transparency is one of the key security attributes of the software supply chain, as a deeper understanding of the chain enables participants to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate threats. Problems in the software supply chain can cause billions in losses and create operational challenges for government and commercial entities, as demonstrated by incidents involving SolarWinds, Bybit, 3CX, Jaguar Land Rover, GitHub, and NotPetya. Modern software is often assembled from third-party libraries and open-source components. According to research by the Linux Foundation and Synopsys, 96% of the commercial codebases analyzed contained open-source software, and 70–90% of a typical codebase may consist of open-source components. Without transparency, any software component can become a threat. As a result, companies may spend billions of dollars building robust external defenses, but this will not protect against vulnerabilities in legitimate software inside the perimeter. At the same time, supply chain attacks also erode trust between customers and their IT providers, as malicious code is often embedded in official updates with certificates and digital signatures. One of the primary ways to ensure transparency is through a software bill of materials, which documents the components used to create the software and the relationships within the supply chain. == Concept == The software supply chain is the collection of systems, devices, people, artifacts, and processes involved in the creation of the final software product. Attacks on the software supply chain differ from conventional attacks in that they follow a four-stage pattern: compromise, modification, distribution, and subsequent exploitation of the compromised or modified component. A defining feature of a supply chain attack is the introduction or manipulation of a change at an upstream stage, which is subsequently exploited at a downstream stage. Transparency refers to the availability of knowledge about the chain, while validity concerns the integrity of operations and artifacts and the authentication of participants, and separation involves reducing unnecessary trust relationships and the radius of impact through compartmentalization. In this framework, transparency primarily helps during the pre-compromise and detection phases, as a clearer understanding of participants, operations, and artifacts makes it easier to identify weak links before attackers exploit them. Current major attack vectors include dependencies and containers, build infrastructure, and human participants, such as maintainers or developers. == History == Software supply-chain transparency developed from earlier efforts to document software components, long before the term came into widespread use in the cybersecurity field. Early component-documentation formats included SPDX, first published in 2011, and CycloneDX, first published in 2017. Initially, these formats were created to support license compliance, package identification, and tool compatibility. Their development helped shape a broader concept of software supply chain transparency, encompassing component documentation, disclosure practices, risk management, security analysis, and regulatory compliance. In 2018, the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration launched a multistakeholder process on promoting software component transparency. This process helped move work on SBOMs from a specialized technical practice into the realm of policy and procurement to identify components used in software products. The 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform made software supply chain security a central issue in government cybersecurity policy. An analysis of the “Sunburst” campaign prepared by the Atlantic Council noted that the vulnerability of the software supply chain had become a realized risk for national-security agencies. In May 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 14028, which directed federal agencies to improve cybersecurity and increase transparency in the software supply chain, including requirements related to SBOMs. Reuters reported that the executive order required software developers selling their products to the federal government to provide greater visibility into their software and make security data available. In July 2021, the NTIA published the document “The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)”, defining the basic data fields and practices for creating SBOMs. Between 2021 and 2025, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency updated its guidance on “Framing Software Component Transparency”, expanding the set of SBOM attributes, metadata requirements, and operational recommendations for the creation, exchange, and use of SBOMs. Major incidents that occurred following the SolarWinds attack have underscored the importance of transparency in vulnerability management and supply chain security. The Log4Shell vulnerability in the Log4j library, disclosed in December 2021, demonstrated how difficult it can be for organizations to identify a vulnerable component deeply embedded within applications and services. In 2024, an attempt to plant a backdoor in XZ Utils showed how attackers could exploit trust in open-source maintenance processes to introduce malicious code into widely used infrastructure software. By the mid-2020s, software supply chain transparency had become part of international cybersecurity coordination and regulation. On September 3, 2025, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Cybersecurity Office, in collaboration with cybersecurity agencies from 15 countries, released the document “A Shared Vision of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Cybersecurity.” In the European Union, the Cyber Resilience Act required manufacturers of products with digital elements to create, maintain, and retain SBOMs as part of the technical documentation for software placed on the EU market. == Transparency mechanisms == The primary mechanism for ensuring transparency is the software bill of materials (SBOM). An SBOM is a structured list of components, libraries, and tools used to build and distribute a software product, and it records dependencies in a way that helps organizations understand and assess their software supply chains. It can also be described as a formal record of components and their interdependencies, which gives users insight into their actual exposure to risks and threats. Five key areas of SBOM application in software supply chain security have been identified: vulnerability management, ensuring transparency, component evaluation, risk assessment, and ensuring supply chain integrity. In software supply chains, an SBOM documents all components, both open-source and proprietary. Under Executive Order 14028, U.S. federal agencies require software suppliers to provide SBOMs for government-procured software. The list of minimum required SBOM elements defined by NTIA includes three main categories: required data fields for describing each component (name, version, identifiers), automation support (machine-readable format, generation tools), and recommendations for creating SBOMs during development and purchasing. The post-2021 push for SBOMs was intended to provide visibility into the components used within software and to expose parts of an application that would otherwise remain hidden. This information can be used to prioritize patches, manage vulnerabilities, and support compliance work. Transparency also supports software traceability, which is becoming a standard feature of developer platforms. Traceability has become important because organizations are increasingly required to demonstrate how software was created, rather than simply listing its components. Higher levels of assurance require signed, tamper-proof traceability and more isolated, verifiable build environments. A related mechanism is build reproducibility. Reproducible builds are defined as build processes that make the compilation process deterministic, ensuring that the same source code always produces the same binary file. These builds are considered a foundational element for distributed verification, transparency-log maintenance, supply-chain workflow integration, and the creation of keyless signatures based on verifiable logs. Although reproducibility does not replace inventory or attestation, it gives external par
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 (DODD 3000.09), titled Autonomy in Weapon Systems, is the current U.S. military policy on autonomous weapons. It states: "Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." == History == Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued DOD's policy on autonomy in weapons systems, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09, in November 2012. DOD updated the directive in January 2023. In February 2023, the US issued a related foreign policy proposal, Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. == Definitions == There is no agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is used in international fora. However, DODD 3000.09 provides definitions for different categories of autonomous weapon systems for the purposes of the U.S. military. These definitions are principally grounded in the role of the human operator with regard to target selection and engagement decisions, rather than in the technological sophistication of the weapon system. DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as "weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." This concept of autonomy is also known as "human out of the loop" or "full autonomy." The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or "human on the loop," autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon's target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or "human in the loop," weapon systems that "only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator." Semi-autonomous weapons include so-called "fire and forget" weapons, such as certain types of guided missiles, that deliver effects to human-identified targets using autonomous functions. The directive does not apply to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace capabilities; unarmed platforms; unguided munitions; munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; unexploded explosive ordnance; or autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not weapon systems, nor subject them to its guidelines. == Role of human operator == DODD 3000.09 requires that all systems, including LAWS, be designed to "allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." As noted in an August 2018 U.S. government white paper, "'appropriate' is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one-size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is 'appropriate' can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system." Furthermore, "human judgment over the use of force" does not require manual human "control" of the weapon system, as is often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon will be used "with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement." To aid this determination, DODD 3000.09 requires that "[a]dequate training, [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions." The directive also requires that the weapon's human-machine interface be "readily understandable to trained operators" so they can make informed decisions regarding the weapon's use. == Weapons review process == DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of covered semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon systems, be tested and evaluated to ensure they:Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries taking realistic and practicable countermeasures, [and] complete engagements within a timeframe and geographic area, as well as other relevant environmental and operational constraints, consistent with commander and operator intentions. If unable to do so, the systems will terminate the engagement or obtain additional operator input before continuing the engagement.Systems must also be "sufficiently robust to minimize the probability and consequences of failures." Any changes to the system's operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would require the system to go through testing and evaluation again to ensure that it has retained its safety features and ability to operate as intended. The directive also notes that "the use of AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous systems will be consistent with the DOD AI Ethical Principles." In addition to the standard weapons review process, a secondary senior-level review is required for covered autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) to approve the system before formal development. USD(P), VCJCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) must then approve the system before fielding. In the event of "urgent military need," this senior-level review may be waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DODD 3000.09 additionally establishes the Autonomous Weapon System Working Group—composed of representatives of USD(P); USD(R&E); USD(A&S); DOD General Counsel; the Chief Digital and AI Officer; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to support and advise the senior-level review process. == Congressional notification == Per Section 251 of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; Pub. L. 118–31 (text) (PDF)), the Secretary of Defense is to notify the defense committees of any changes to DODD 3000.09 within 30 days. The Secretary is directed to provide a description of the modification and an explanation of the reasons for the modification. Section 1066 of the FY2025 NDAA (Pub. L. 118–159 (text) (PDF)) additionally requires the Secretary to "submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive report on the approval and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems by the United States," annually through December 31, 2029. Section 1061 of the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. Pub. L. 119–60 (menu; GPO has not yet published law)) amends the U.S. Code to require congressional notification of any waiver issued under DODD 3000.09. == AI safety == The second revision of DoDD 3000.09, effective January 25, 2023, requires that "The DoD will design and engineer AI capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the ability to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and the ability to disengage or deactivate deployed systems that demonstrate unintended behavior." == Criticism == As noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the policy requires that autonomous weapon systems that kill people or use kinetic force, selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, be certified as compliant with "appropriate levels" and other standards, not that such weapon systems cannot meet these standards and are therefore forbidden. "Semi-autonomous" hunter-killers that autonomously identify and attack targets do not require certification.
Stewart Nelson
Stewart Nelson is an American mathematician and programmer from The Bronx who co-founded Systems Concepts. == Biography == From a young age, Nelson was tinkering with electronics, aided and abetted by his father who was a physicist that had become an engineer. Stewart attended Poughkeepsie High School, graduating in the spring of 1963. From his first few days of High School, Stewart displayed his talents for hacking the international telephone trunk lines, along with an uncanny skill for picking combination locks, although this was always done as innocent entertainment. He simply loved the challenge of seeing how quickly he could accomplish this feat. His quirky sense of humor was always visible, as was his disdain for any rule that got in the way of his gaining knowledge. Stewart was an inspiration to the school's Tech-elec Club, as well as a ringleader in the founding of the school's pirate radio station. Nelson enrolled at MIT in 1963 and quickly became known for hooking up the AI Lab's PDP-1 (and later the PDP-6) to the telephone network, making him one of the first phreakers. Nelson later accomplished other feats like hard-wiring additional instructions into the PDP-1. Nelson was hired by Ed Fredkin's Information International Inc. at the urging of Marvin Minsky to work on PDP-7 programs at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. Nelson was known as a brilliant software programmer. He was influential in LISP, the assembly instructions for the Digital Equipment Corporation PDP, and a number of other systems. The group of young hackers was known for working on systems after hours. One night, Nelson and others decided to rewire MIT's PDP-1 as a prank. Later, Margaret Hamilton tried to use the DEC-supplied DECAL assembler on the machine and it crashed repeatedly.
Lisp machine
Lisp machines are general-purpose computers designed to efficiently run Lisp as their main software and programming language, usually via hardware support. They are an example of a high-level language computer architecture. In a sense, they were the first commercial single-user workstations. Despite being modest in number (perhaps 7,000 units total as of 1988) Lisp machines commercially pioneered some now-commonplace technologies, including networking innovations such as Chaosnet, and effective garbage collection. Several firms built and sold Lisp machines in the 1980s: Symbolics (3600, 3640, XL1200, MacIvory, and other models), Lisp Machines Incorporated (LMI Lambda), Texas Instruments (Explorer, MicroExplorer), and Xerox (Interlisp-D workstations). The operating systems were written in Lisp Machine Lisp, Interlisp (Xerox), and later partly in Common Lisp. == History == === Historical context === Artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs of the 1960s and 1970s intrinsically required what was then considered a huge amount of computer power, as measured in processor time and memory space. The power requirements of AI research were exacerbated by the Lisp symbolic programming language, when commercial hardware was designed and optimized for assembly- and Fortran-like programming languages. At first, the cost of such computer hardware meant that it had to be shared among many users. As integrated circuit technology shrank the size and cost of computers in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the memory needs of AI programs began to exceed the address space of the most common research computer, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) PDP-10, researchers considered a new approach: a computer designed specifically to develop and run large artificial intelligence programs, and tailored to the semantics of the Lisp language. To provide consistent performance for interactive programs, these machines would often not be shared, but would be dedicated to a single user at a time. === Initial development === In 1973, Richard Greenblatt and Thomas Knight, programmers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (AI Lab), began what would become the MIT Lisp Machine Project when they first began building a computer hardwired to run certain basic Lisp operations, rather than run them in software, in a 24-bit tagged architecture. The machine also did incremental (or Arena) garbage collection. More specifically, since Lisp variables are typed at runtime rather than compile time, a simple addition of two variables could take five times as long on conventional hardware, due to test and branch instructions. Lisp Machines ran the tests in parallel with the more conventional single instruction additions. If the simultaneous tests failed, then the result was discarded and recomputed; this meant in many cases a speed increase by several factors. This simultaneous checking approach was used as well in testing the bounds of arrays when referenced, and other memory management necessities (not merely garbage collection or arrays). Type checking was further improved and automated when the conventional byte word of 32 bits was lengthened to 36 bits for Symbolics 3600-model Lisp machines and eventually to 40 bits or more (usually, the excess bits not accounted for by the following were used for error-correcting codes). The first group of extra bits were used to hold type data, making the machine a tagged architecture, and the remaining bits were used to implement compressed data representation (CDR) coding (wherein the usual linked list elements are compressed to occupy roughly half the space), aiding garbage collection by reportedly an order of magnitude. A further improvement was two microcode instructions which specifically supported Lisp functions, reducing the cost of calling a function to as little as 20 clock cycles, in some Symbolics implementations. The first machine was called the CONS machine (named after the list construction operator cons in Lisp). Often it was affectionately referred to as the Knight machine, perhaps since Knight wrote his master's thesis on the subject; it was extremely well received. It was subsequently improved into a version called CADR (a pun; in Lisp, the cadr function, which returns the second item of a list, is pronounced /ˈkeɪ.dəɹ/ or /ˈkɑ.dəɹ/, as some pronounce the word "cadre") which was based on essentially the same architecture. About 25 of what were essentially prototype CADRs were sold within and without MIT for ~$50,000; it quickly became the favorite machine for hacking – many of the most favored software tools were quickly ported to it (e.g. Emacs was ported from ITS in 1975). It was so well received at an AI conference held at MIT in 1978 that Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding its development. === Commercializing MIT Lisp machine technology === In 1979, Russell Noftsker, being convinced that Lisp machines had a bright commercial future due to the strength of the Lisp language and the enabling factor of hardware acceleration, proposed to Greenblatt that they commercialize the technology. In a counter-intuitive move for an AI Lab hacker, Greenblatt acquiesced, hoping perhaps that he could recreate the informal and productive atmosphere of the Lab in a real business. These ideas and goals were considerably different from those of Noftsker. The two negotiated at length, but neither would compromise. As the proposed firm could succeed only with the full and undivided assistance of the AI Lab hackers as a group, Noftsker and Greenblatt decided that the fate of the enterprise was up to them, and so the choice should be left to the hackers. The ensuing discussions of the choice divided the lab into two factions. In February 1979, matters came to a head. The hackers sided with Noftsker, believing that a commercial venture-fund-backed firm had a better chance of surviving and commercializing Lisp machines than Greenblatt's proposed self-sustaining start-up. Greenblatt lost the battle. It was at this juncture that Symbolics, Noftsker's enterprise, slowly came together. While Noftsker was paying his staff a salary, he had no building or any equipment for the hackers to work on. He bargained with Patrick Winston that, in exchange for allowing Symbolics' staff to keep working out of MIT, Symbolics would let MIT use internally and freely all the software Symbolics developed. A consultant from CDC, who was trying to put together a natural language computer application with a group of West-coast programmers, came to Greenblatt, seeking a Lisp machine for his group to work with, about eight months after the disastrous conference with Noftsker. Greenblatt had decided to start his own rival Lisp machine firm, but he had done nothing. The consultant, Alexander Jacobson, decided that the only way Greenblatt was going to start the firm and build the Lisp machines that Jacobson desperately needed was if Jacobson pushed and otherwise helped Greenblatt launch the firm. Jacobson pulled together business plans, a board, a partner for Greenblatt (one F. Stephen Wyle). The newfound firm was named LISP Machine, Inc. (LMI), and was funded by CDC orders, via Jacobson. Around this time Symbolics (Noftsker's firm) began operating. It had been hindered by Noftsker's promise to give Greenblatt a year's head start, and by severe delays in procuring venture capital. Symbolics still had the major advantage that while 3 or 4 of the AI Lab hackers had gone to work for Greenblatt, 14 other hackers had signed onto Symbolics. Two AI Lab people were not hired by either: Richard Stallman and Marvin Minsky. Stallman, however, blamed Symbolics for the decline of the hacker community that had centered around the AI lab. For two years, from 1982 to the end of 1983, Stallman worked by himself to clone the output of the Symbolics programmers, with the aim of preventing them from gaining a monopoly on the lab's computers. Regardless, after a series of internal battles, Symbolics did get off the ground in 1980/1981, selling the CADR as the LM-2, while Lisp Machines, Inc. sold it as the LMI-CADR. Symbolics did not intend to produce many LM-2s, since the 3600 family of Lisp machines was supposed to ship quickly, but the 3600s were repeatedly delayed, and Symbolics ended up producing ~100 LM-2s, each of which sold for $70,000. Both firms developed second-generation products based on the CADR: the Symbolics 3600 and the LMI-LAMBDA (of which LMI managed to sell ~200). The 3600, which shipped a year late, expanded on the CADR by widening the machine word to 36-bits, expanding the address space to 28-bits, and adding hardware to accelerate certain common functions that were implemented in microcode on the CADR. The LMI-LAMBDA, which came out a year after the 3600, in 1983, was compatible with the CADR (it could run CADR microcode), but hardware differences existed. Texas Instruments (TI) joined the fray whe
Site-specific browser
A site-specific browser (SSB) is a software application dedicated to accessing pages from a single source (site) on a computer network such as the Internet or a private intranet. SSBs typically simplify the more complex functions of a web browser by excluding the menus, toolbars and browser graphical user interface associated with functions that are external to the workings of a single site. Modern site-specific browsers range from simple browser windows without navigation controls to sophisticated desktop applications built with frameworks like Electron that bundle entire browser engines. This evolution has enabled many popular desktop applications to be built using web technologies, effectively making them advanced site-specific browsers. == History == === Early development === One of the earliest examples of an SSB was MacDICT, a Mac OS 9 application that accessed various websites to define, translate, or find synonyms for words typed into a text box. However, the first general-purpose SSB is considered to be Bubbles, which launched in late 2005 on the Windows platform. Bubbles introduced the term "Site Specific Extensions" for SSB userscripts and created the first SSB JavaScript API. In 2007, Mozilla announced Prism (originally called WebRunner), a project to integrate web applications with the desktop. That same year, Todd Ditchendorf, a former Apple Dashboard engineer, released Fluid for macOS. On 2 September 2008, Google Chrome was released with a built-in "Create application shortcut" feature, bringing SSB functionality to mainstream users. This feature allowed any website to be launched in a separate window without the browser interface. === Modern era === The landscape of site-specific browsers changed dramatically with the introduction of Electron in 2013 (originally called Atom Shell). Electron combined Chromium and Node.js into a single runtime, enabling developers to build desktop applications using web technologies. This framework has since powered applications used by hundreds of millions of users, including Visual Studio Code, Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Teams. In 2015, the concept of Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) was introduced by Google engineers Alex Russell and Frances Berriman, representing a parallel evolution in web-to-desktop technology. While PWAs share similar goals with SSBs, they follow web standards and can be installed directly from browsers. More recently, alternative frameworks like Tauri have emerged, offering significantly smaller application sizes by using the system's native web renderer instead of bundling Chromium. == Technical implementation == Site-specific browsers can be implemented through various approaches: === Browser-based SSBs === The simplest form of SSB is created through browser features that allow websites to run in separate windows without the standard browser interface. Modern Chromium-based browsers offer "Install as app" or "Create shortcut" functionality that creates a dedicated window for a specific website. These SSBs share the browser's underlying engine and resources but operate in isolated windows. === Framework-based SSBs === More sophisticated SSBs are built using application frameworks: Electron: Bundles a complete Chromium browser with Node.js, resulting in applications of 85MB or larger. Each Electron application runs its own browser instance, providing full access to system APIs but consuming significant resources. Tauri: Uses the operating system's native web rendering engine (WebView2 on Windows, WebKit on macOS, and WebKitGTK on Linux), resulting in applications typically 2.5-10MB in size. Other frameworks: Include Neutralino.js (ultra-lightweight using system browser), Wails (Go-based), and the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF). == Comparison with Progressive Web Apps == While site-specific browsers and Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) share the goal of bringing web content to the desktop, they differ in several key aspects: == Applications == Site-specific browsers have become the foundation for many popular desktop applications: Communication and collaboration: Many modern communication tools are built as SSBs, including Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and WhatsApp Desktop. These applications benefit from web-based development while providing desktop integration. Development tools: Visual Studio Code, used by 73.6% of developers according to Stack Overflow's 2024 survey, is built with Electron, as are Atom and GitHub Desktop. Productivity software: Applications like Notion, Obsidian, and various project management tools use SSB technology to provide consistent experiences across platforms. Security and Privacy: Web browsers can be modified to only have access to a single site, in order to protect the security and privacy of the user via compartmentalization == Security and performance == === Memory usage === Framework-based SSBs, particularly those using Electron, are known for high memory consumption. Studies show Electron applications typically use 120-300MB at baseline, with complex applications consuming significantly more. This is approximately 5-10 times more memory than equivalent native applications. === Security considerations === SSBs can provide security benefits through process isolation, where each application runs in its own sandboxed environment. However, bundling an entire browser engine also means each application must be updated independently to patch security vulnerabilities. Research presented at the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium has identified various security challenges specific to Electron applications. === Bundle sizes === The choice of framework significantly impacts application size: Electron applications: 85MB+ (includes full Chromium) Tauri applications: 2.5-10MB (uses system WebView) Browser-based SSBs: No additional download (uses existing browser) == Software == === Browser support === Most modern browsers provide some form of SSB functionality: Chromium-based browsers (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi): "Install as app" or "Create shortcut" feature Safari: "Add to Dock" feature in macOS Sonoma (2023) Firefox: Removed SSB support in December 2020 (version 85) GNOME Web: "Install Site as Web Application" feature === Standalone tools === ==== Active ==== WebCatalog (Windows, macOS, Linux) – Manages multiple SSBs with isolated storage Fluid (macOS) – Pioneering SSB creator for Mac Unite (macOS) – Creates SSBs with customization options Coherence X (macOS) – Advanced SSB creation tool Pake (cross-platform) – Open-source SSB creator Wavebox (cross-platform) – Workspace browser with SSB features ==== Discontinued ==== Mozilla Prism – Cross-platform SSB creator (discontinued 2011) Nativefier – Command-line SSB creator (discontinued 2023) Epichrome – macOS SSB creator (discontinued 2021) === Development frameworks === Electron – Most popular framework, bundles Chromium and Node.js Tauri – Rust-based framework using system WebView Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) – C++ library for embedding Chromium Neutralino.js – Lightweight framework using system browser Wails – Go-based framework for web frontends
John F. Sowa
John Florian Sowa (born 1940) is an American computer scientist, an expert in artificial intelligence and computer design, and the inventor of conceptual graphs. == Biography == Sowa received a BS in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1962, an MA in applied mathematics from Harvard University in 1966, and a PhD in computer science from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in 1999 with a dissertation titled "Knowledge Representation: Logical, Philosophical, and Computational Foundations". Sowa spent most of his professional career at IBM, starting in 1962 at IBM's applied mathematics group. Over the decades he has researched and developed emerging fields of computer science from compilers, programming languages, and system architecture to artificial intelligence and knowledge representation. In the 1990s Sowa was associated with the IBM Educational Center in New York. Over the years he taught courses at the IBM Systems Research Institute, Binghamton University, Stanford University, the Linguistic Society of America and the Université du Québec à Montréal. He is a fellow of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. After early retirement at IBM, Sowa in 2001 cofounded VivoMind Intelligence, Inc. with Arun K. Majumdar. With this company he was developing data-mining and database technology, more specifically high-level "ontologies" for artificial intelligence and automated natural language understanding. Currently Sowa is working with Kyndi Inc., also founded by Majumdar. John Sowa is married to the philologist Cora Angier Sowa, and they live in Croton-on-Hudson, New York. == Work == Sowa's research interests since the 1970s were in the field of artificial intelligence, expert systems and database query linked to natural languages. In his work he combines ideas from numerous disciplines and eras modern and ancient, for example, applying ideas from Aristotle, the medieval scholastics to Alfred North Whitehead and including database schema theory, and incorporating the model of analogy of Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah in his works. === Conceptual graph === Sowa invented conceptual graphs, a graphic notation for logic and natural language, based on the structures in semantic networks and on the existential graphs of Charles S. Peirce. He introduced the concept in the 1976 article "Conceptual graphs for a data base interface" in the IBM Journal of Research and Development. He elaborated upon it in the 1983 book Conceptual structures: information processing in mind and machine. In the 1980s, this theory had "been adopted by a number of research and development groups throughout the world. International conferences on conceptual structures (ICCS) have been held since 1993, following a series of conceptual graph workshops that began in 1986. === Sowa's law of standards === In 1991, Sowa first stated his Law of Standards: "Whenever a major organization develops a new system as an official standard for X, the primary result is the widespread adoption of some simpler system as a de facto standard for X." Like Gall's law, The Law of Standards is essentially an argument in favour of underspecification. Examples include: The introduction of PL/I resulting in COBOL and FORTRAN becoming the de facto standards for business and scientific programming respectively The introduction of Algol-68 resulting in Pascal becoming the de facto standard for academic programming The introduction of the Ada language resulting in C becoming the de facto standard for US Department of Defense programming The introduction of OS/2 resulting in Windows becoming the de facto standard for desktop OS The introduction of X.400 resulting in SMTP becoming the de facto standard for electronic mail The introduction of X.500 resulting in LDAP becoming the de facto standard for directory services == Publications == 1984. Conceptual Structures - Information Processing in Mind and Machine. The Systems Programming Series, Addison-Wesley 1991. Principles of Semantic Networks. Morgan Kaufmann. Mineau, Guy W; Moulin, Bernard; Sowa, John F, eds. (1993). Conceptual Graphs for Knowledge Representation. LNCS. Vol. 699. doi:10.1007/3-540-56979-0. ISBN 978-3-540-56979-4. S2CID 32275791. 1994. International Conference on Conceptual Structures (2nd : 1994 : College Park, Md.) Conceptual structures, current practices : Second International Conference on Conceptual Structures, ICCS'94, College Park, Maryland, USA, August 16–20, 1994 : proceedings. William M. Tepfenhart, Judith P. Dick, John F. Sowa, eds. Ellis, Gerard; Levinson, Robert; Rich, William; Sowa, John F, eds. (1995). Conceptual Structures: Applications, Implementation and Theory. LNCS. Vol. 954. doi:10.1007/3-540-60161-9. ISBN 978-3-540-60161-6. S2CID 27300281. Lukose, Dickson; Delugach, Harry; Keeler, Mary; Searle, Leroy; Sowa, John, eds. (1997). Conceptual Structures: Fulfilling Peirce's Dream. LNCS. Vol. 1257. doi:10.1007/BFb0027865. ISBN 3-540-63308-1. S2CID 1934069. 2000. Knowledge representation : logical, philosophical, and computational foundations, Brooks Cole Publishing Co., Pacific Grove Articles, a selection Sowa, J. F. (July 1976). "Conceptual Graphs for a Data Base Interface". IBM Journal of Research and Development. 20 (4): 336–357. doi:10.1147/rd.204.0336. Sowa, J. F.; Zachman, J. A. (1992). "Extending and formalizing the framework for information systems architecture". IBM Systems Journal. 31 (3): 590–616. doi:10.1147/sj.313.0590. 1992. "Conceptual Graph Summary"; In: T.E. Nagle et al. (Eds.). Conceptual Structures: Current Research and Practice. Chichester: Ellis Horwood. 1995. "Top-level ontological categories." in: International journal of human-computer studies. Vol. 43, Iss. 5–6, Nov. 1995, pp. 669–685 2006. "Semantic Networks". In: Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.. John Wiley & Sons.